Ruud Broens wrote:

"Ruud Broens" wrote in message
...
:
: "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: ...
: : Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: :
: : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : means simply that there are *good
: : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : there will be a real difference.
: :
: : --
: : -S
:
: ok, logic 101:
: if A implies B, not B does NOT imply *not A.
: example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
:
: you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: -it-will-rain :-)
: cheerio,
: Rudy
*
oops, that comes from multitasking,

not

I suppose your point is supposed to be that "affirming the consequent",
as it's often called, is a fallacy. That much is certainly true.
However, not only is your example confused (you have to use the exact
same sentence for A and B in each proposition, for one thing), it's far
from clear how this point would apply to the post to which you are
responding.

In short, if there are possible cognitive biases that could provide an
alternative explanation for the results (and we know that there is, at
the very least, the potential that such biases could be operating), and
you fail to control for them, then there are always going to be good
reasons to doubt whether there is actually audible difference, or
whether the apparent perceived differences were merely attributable to
the cognitive biases.

This is just a basic point about experimental methodology and the need
to control for variables -- it has nothing to do with the fallacy of
affriming the consequent. If you don't take measures to prevent possible
alternative causes that might produce an observed effect, you'll never
know what the effect is attributable to. It ain't complicated.

"johnebravo836" wrote in message
...
:
:
: Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: "Ruud Broens" wrote in message
: ...
: :
: : "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: : ...
: : : Ruud Broens wrote:
: :
: : : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: : :
: : : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : : means simply that there are *good
: : : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : : there will be a real difference.
: : :
: : : --
: : : -S
: :
: : ok, logic 101:
: : if A implies B, not B does NOT imply *not A.
: : example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
: :
: : you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: : -it-will-rain :-)
: : cheerio,
: : Rudy
: *
: oops, that comes from multitasking,
:
: not
:
: I suppose your point is supposed to be that "affirming the consequent",
: as it's often called, is a fallacy. That much is certainly true.
: However, not only is your example confused (you have to use the exact
: same sentence for A and B in each proposition, for one thing), it's far
: from clear how this point would apply to the post to which you are
: responding.
:
: In short, if there are possible cognitive biases that could provide an
: alternative explanation for the results (and we know that there is, at
: the very least, the potential that such biases could be operating), and
: you fail to control for them, then there are always going to be good
: reasons to doubt whether there is actually audible difference, or
: whether the apparent perceived differences were merely attributable to
: the cognitive biases.
:
: This is just a basic point about experimental methodology and the need
: to control for variables -- it has nothing to do with the fallacy of
: affriming the consequent. If you don't take measures to prevent possible
: alternative causes that might produce an observed effect, you'll never
: know what the effect is attributable to. It ain't complicated.

yes, yes, is that a 386 you're using ? google it up, been discussed before
here. doubt is good, a priori rejection is not , ok ?
in short,
Rudy

johnebravo836 wrote
Ruud Broens wrote:
Ruud Broens wrote
: : Steven Sullivan wrote
: : Ruud Broens wrote:
:


: : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: :
: : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : means simply that there are *good
: : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : there will be a real difference.
: :
: : --
: : -S
:
: ok, logic 101:
: if A implies B, not B does NOT imply *not A.
: example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
:
: you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: -it-will-rain :-)
: cheerio,
: Rudy
*
oops, that comes from multitasking,

not

I suppose your point is supposed to be that "affirming the consequent", as
it's often called, is a fallacy. That much is certainly true. However, not
only is your example confused (you have to use the exact same sentence for A
and B in each proposition, for one thing), it's far from clear how this
point would apply to the post to which you are responding.


In short, if there are possible cognitive biases that could provide an
alternative explanation for the results (and we know that there is, at the
very least, the potential that such biases could be operating), and you fail
to control for them, then there are always going to be good reasons to doubt
whether there is actually audible difference, or whether the apparent
perceived differences were merely attributable to the cognitive biases.


Well, in short, you seek out sonic attribute that appeal to you.
These aren't necessarily driven by biases. You made mention of
affirming the consequent as a fallacy, use it here.

Preferences is not a preference to practice disapprobation of your
biases.




This is just a basic point about experimental methodology and the need to
control for variables -- it has nothing to do with the fallacy of affriming
the consequent. If you don't take measures to prevent possible alternative
causes that might produce an observed effect, you'll never know what the
effect is attributable to. It ain't complicated.


Good luck.

On Wed, 30 Nov 2005 22:33:10 -0500, "Arny Krueger"
wrote:

Middius has taught you well!

You sound like Darth Vader.

"paul packer" wrote in message
...
: On Wed, 30 Nov 2005 22:33:10 -0500, "Arny Krueger"
: wrote:
:
: Middius has taught you well!
:
: You sound like Darth Vader.
:
hmm, yes, i wondered about if that was what Arny was using*,
knowing Middius likes SF :-)
R.

*more likely, just a coincidence

wrote in message
ups.com...
Gee, both your reply to me and Arny's reply looks like complete
gibberish. You guys look scared.

Boon

LOOK scared? That seems to be the gibberish statement.

I simply would not like to leave off the frequencies below 35 Hz that are
present in music.

Since I have response that is 3 dB down at 20 HZ, listening to something
that cuts off at 35 Hz is a sacrifice I'm not willing to make.

Ruud Broens wrote:

"Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
...
: Ruud Broens wrote:

: that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
:
: That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: "Not-having-listened" with controls
: for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: means simply that there are *good
: reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: there will be a real difference.
:
: --
: -S

ok, logic 101:
if A implies B, not B does NOT imply A.
example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me

you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
-it-will-rain :-)
cheerio,
Rudy


That's all well and good --but has nothing to do with what I wrote.

Want to try again?


Focus on the differences between these statements; I've helpfully highlighted them:


strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it means the shortcomings you report *are*
imaginary


actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods, it means the shortcomings you report
*may be* imaginary.

Sillybot pounds his pulpit.

if you don't use blind methods, it means the shortcomings you report
*may be* imaginary.

What "methods" do you use, Silly? Oh that's right -- none at all. No method
of evaluation is good enough for Sillybot. You already know everything
sounds the same, so there's no point in any kind of evaluation.

Nicely neat and tidy, isn't it.

"Steven Sullivan" wrote in message


Want to try again?


Focus on the differences between these statements; I've
helpfully highlighted them:


strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it
means the shortcomings you report *are* imaginary


actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods,
it means the shortcomings you report *may be* imaginary.

This is way too deep for most RAO regulars, Steven.

Arny Krueger wrote
Steven Sullivan wrote




Want to try again?


Focus on the differences between these statements; I've
helpfully highlighted them:


strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it
means the shortcomings you report *are* imaginary


actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods,
it means the shortcomings you report *may be* imaginary.

This is way too deep for most RAO regulars, Steven.



I'm not sure what you're burbling about but the alluring
statement you find so fascinating above will fall apart.
How are you doing with your tail, btw?


Any problem ?

"Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
...
: Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: ...
: : Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: :
: : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : means simply that there are *good
: : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : there will be a real difference.
: :
: : --
: : -S
:
: ok, logic 101:
: if A implies B, not B does NOT imply A.
: example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
:
: you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: -it-will-rain :-)
: cheerio,
: Rudy
:
:
: That's all well and good --but has nothing to do with what I wrote.
:
: Want to try again?
:
yeah, what's with those monday morning classes, eh ?
one sets up a test with controls and models and procedures
in place to get a meaningful result. or at least a result that can
be ascribed to those factors that were not invariant.
all part of established and adhered to scientific modi operandi.

here is my question no. 1: in what way is an EE qualified to set up
a test about perception of qualities or differences ?
failing that, we have the operationism problem again - you _have_
looked that up, by know, i hope.

:: Focus on the differences between these statements

I usually focus on what interests ~moi~, monsieur Sullivan :-)
like
" Conceptually, a well-done level-matched double blind protocol will
suffice to objectively establish that.. SS last month"

...no need to continue if there _is not_ in fact a well-done setup, eh ?
:
: strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it means the shortcomings you
report *are*
: imaginary
:
:
: actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods, it means the
shortcomings you report
: *may be* imaginary.
:

i let google work on that, first stated on RAO : ehhm, dec 5, 2005
yeeas, we can savely assume, that's what you've been saying, all along,
in good Arny tradition, that is :-)

does this mean the word delusional has been scrapped from the Big Borg Codebook,
then ? fascinating, captain.

Rudy
...to be continued..

Ruud Broens wrote:

"Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
...
: Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: ...
: : Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: :
: : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : means simply that there are *good
: : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : there will be a real difference.
: :
: : --
: : -S
:
: ok, logic 101:
: if A implies B, not B does NOT imply A.
: example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
:
: you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: -it-will-rain :-)
: cheerio,
: Rudy
:
:
: That's all well and good --but has nothing to do with what I wrote.
:
: Want to try again?
:
yeah, what's with those monday morning classes, eh ?
one sets up a test with controls and models and procedures
in place to get a meaningful result. or at least a result that can
be ascribed to those factors that were not invariant.
all part of established and adhered to scientific modi operandi.

here is my question no. 1: in what way is an EE qualified to set up
a test about perception of qualities or differences ?
failing that, we have the operationism problem again - you _have_
looked that up, by know, i hope.

:: Focus on the differences between these statements

I usually focus on what interests ~moi~, monsieur Sullivan :-)
like
" Conceptually, a well-done level-matched double blind protocol will
suffice to objectively establish that.. SS last month"

..no need to continue if there _is not_ in fact a well-done setup, eh ?
:
: strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it means the shortcomings you
report *are*
: imaginary
:
:
: actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods, it means the
shortcomings you report
: *may be* imaginary.
:

i let google work on that, first stated on RAO : ehhm, dec 5, 2005
yeeas, we can savely assume, that's what you've been saying, all along,
in good Arny tradition, that is :-)

does this mean the word delusional has been scrapped from the Big Borg Codebook,
then ? fascinating, captain.

Rudy
..to be continued..


Frankly, I've never been that much of a fan of stream-of-consciousness writing.
It tends to bore me.

I mention this by way of explaining why I won't be expending the
effort to try to parse your latest contribution, above.



--
-S
"The most appealing intuitive argument for atheism is the mindblowing stupidity of religious
fundamentalists." -- Ginger Yellow

"Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
...
: Ruud Broens wrote:
:
: "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: ...
: : Ruud Broens wrote:
: :
: : "Steven Sullivan" wrote in message
: : ...
: : : Ruud Broens wrote:
: :
: : : that not-having-listened in a dbt setting automatically suggests
: : : they are epiphemeral, imagined rather than actual perceived
: : : shortcomings. That is just not logically consistent - i'm sure
: : : that giving it some thought makes that selfevident
: : :
: : : That is a strawman, when you put it that way.
: : : "Not-having-listened" with controls
: : : for cognitive biases -- whose existence is beyond doubt --
: : : means simply that there are *good
: : : reasons* to doubt the reality of the difference.
: : : That's if the listening results are taken in isolation.
: : : There may be supporting reasons to believe the difference was real
: : : -- for example, if the report is about two loudspeakers,
: : : the measurable variability of such electromechanical systems
: : : is great enough to predict with some confidence that
: : : there will be a real difference.
: : :
: : : --
: : : -S
: :
: : ok, logic 101:
: : if A implies B, not B does NOT imply A.
: : example: if the sun shines, i won't take my umbrella with me
: :
: : you're saying it's like, when i _do_ take my umbrella with me
: : -it-will-rain :-)
: : cheerio,
: : Rudy
: :
: :
: : That's all well and good --but has nothing to do with what I wrote.
: :
: : Want to try again?
: :
: yeah, what's with those monday morning classes, eh ?
: one sets up a test with controls and models and procedures
: in place to get a meaningful result. or at least a result that can
: be ascribed to those factors that were not invariant.
: all part of established and adhered to scientific modi operandi.
:
: here is my question no. 1: in what way is an EE qualified to set up
: a test about perception of qualities or differences ?
: failing that, we have the operationism problem again - you _have_
: looked that up, by know, i hope.
:
: :: Focus on the differences between these statements
:
: I usually focus on what interests ~moi~, monsieur Sullivan :-)
: like
: " Conceptually, a well-done level-matched double blind protocol will
: suffice to objectively establish that.. SS last month"
:
: ..no need to continue if there _is not_ in fact a well-done setup, eh ?
: :
: : strawman argument: if you don't use blind methods it means the shortcomings
you
: report *are*
: : imaginary
: :
: :
: : actual realist argument: if you don't use blind methods, it means the
: shortcomings you report
: : *may be* imaginary.
: :
:
: i let google work on that, first stated on RAO : ehhm, dec 5, 2005
: yeeas, we can savely assume, that's what you've been saying, all along,
: in good Arny tradition, that is :-)
:
: does this mean the word delusional has been scrapped from the Big Borg
Codebook,
: then ? fascinating, captain.
:
: Rudy
: ..to be continued..
:
:
: Frankly, I've never been that much of a fan of stream-of-consciousness writing.
: It tends to bore me.
:
: I mention this by way of explaining why I won't be expending the
: effort to try to parse your latest contribution, above.
:
:
:
: --
: -S
: "The most appealing intuitive argument for atheism is the mindblowing stupidity
of religious
: fundamentalists." -- Ginger Yellow

shatever blows yur mind, Steve ;-)
giving up, waving hands in the air, err parsing attemps - noted :-)
R.-

Ruud Broens wrote:


shatever blows yur mind, Steve ;-)
giving up, waving hands in the air, err parsing attemps - noted :-)
R.-


er....quite.



--
-S. "babbling brooks get boring too" Sullivan